The geometry of learning by Calcagni, Gianluca
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
00
59
1v
3 
 [q
-b
io.
QM
]  2
2 A
pr 
20
18
The geometry of learning
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Abstract
We establish a correspondence between Pavlovian conditioning processes and fractals. The association strength at a training trial
corresponds to a point in a disconnected set at a given iteration level. In this way, one can represent a training process as a hopping
on a fractal set, instead of the traditional learning curve as a function of the trial. The main advantage of this novel perspective
is to provide an elegant classification of associative theories in terms of the geometric features of fractal sets. In particular, the
dimension of fractals can measure the efficiency of conditioning models. We illustrate the correspondence with the examples of the
Hull, Rescorla–Wagner, and Mackintosh models and show that they are equivalent to a Cantor set. More generally, conditioning
programs are described by the geometry of their associated fractal, which gives much more information than just its dimension.
We show this in several examples of random fractals and also comment on a possible relation between our formalism and other
“fractal” findings in the cognitive literature.
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Highlights
• A correspondence between Pavlovian conditioning pro-
cesses and fractals is proposed.
• This duality is applied to many associative theories and
conditioning programs.
• 1/ f scaling in human cognition and a random fractal
model are compared.
• Slow learning can be interpreted as an excitatory process
contaminated by inhibition.
• Individual response is characterized by progressively
damped fluctuations.
1. Introduction
Making psychology quantitative has been a difficult but fea-
sible challenge since the first laboratory of psychophysiology
established by Wundt. Making it a mathematical theory under
analytic control has been, and possibly will always be, a utopia.
Nevertheless, there are a plethora of analytic models which are
able to fit and explain data coming from the observation of sub-
jects in specific experiments. For instance, in the context of
behavioral theories of Pavlovian conditioning, one can study
the interplay between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and the sub-
sequent occurrence of an unconditioned stimulus (US) of typi-
cally high relevance for the subject, such as food or an electric
discharge. Despite their limited range of applicability, associa-
tive conditioning models are useful for several reasons. First,
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they express in a compact and economic way concepts that took
time and many pages to be formulated. For example, the fact
that “the prior activity influences the value of” the stimulus, rec-
ognized since the early stages of functionalism (Dewey, 1896),
translates effectively in a description of conditioning as an itera-
tive process progressively modifying the strength of the associ-
ation and the salience of the stimulus. Second, they offer novel
insights that can be easily checked and falsified quantitatively
as new data and experimental designs become available. The
question we would like to pose in this paper, limited to animal
and human behavior, is: How much can we expand our toolbox
of mathematical models in order to extract valuable information
on learning processes?
The classic 1950s theoretical approaches to simple cases
of conditioning are cast in the language of probability theory
[see, e.g., the works by Bush and Mosteller (1951a; 1951b;
1953), Estes (1950), Estes and Burke (1953), and the reviews by
Bower (1994) and Mosteller (1958)]. In these models, one con-
siders the probability p of a given conditioned response (CR)
as a function of the trial number n. The increment ∆pn at each
trial is linear in pn; by evaluating pn iteratively, one obtains a
learning curve. Alternatively, the probability p can be replaced
by the strength of association V . This change of variable is
useful for phenomenological applications because V , although
mediated by internal variables such as the organism’s motiva-
tional state or attention, can directly be measured by several
performance indicators, in primis the subject response. For in-
stance, the quality of surprise in the US as a function of the
appearance of the CS was first suggested by Kamin in relation
with cue competition (Kamin, 1968; 1969). For a single CS, the
evolution of the novelty (or “surprisingness”) of the US along
the learning curve had been made quantitative already by Hull
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in his linear model of Pavlovian conditioning (Hull, 1943). Re-
cast in modern terminology by Rescorla andWagner (1972) and
Wagner and Rescorla (1972), this model states that the change
∆Vn in the strength of the association at the nth trial is
∆Vn = αβ(λ − Vn−1) , n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , (1)
where 0 6 α 6 1 is the salience of the CS, 0 6 β 6 1 is the
salience of the US, and 0 6 λ 6 1 is the magnitude or intensity
of the US (i.e., the asymptote of learning). The term λ − Vn−1
indicates the surprisingness of the US, which decreases as the
associative strength increases. The association strength gained
up to the start of the nth trial can be found iteratively:
Vn = Vn−1 + ∆Vn = (1 − αβ)Vn−1 + αβλ . (2)
The solution of this equation is
Vn = λ[1 − (1 − αβ)
n−1] . (3)
When no association has been made yet, at the beginning of
the first trial V1 = 0, which fixes the unphysical constant V0 =
−αβλ/(1 − αβ). When λ , 0, the conditioning is excitatory
and the US always occurs after the CS. Maximum learning is
achieved when V = λ. If λ = 0, the US does not show up
after the CS and the conditioning is inhibitory or of extinction.
Rescorla and Wagner extended the linear model to the case of
the presentation of multiple CSs (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972;
Wagner & Rescorla, 1972), as we will discuss later.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a geomet-
ric interpretation of learning processes which carries several
advantages. First, it is useful at the time of assessing the ef-
ficiency of these processes quantitatively, both within a given
model (how efficiency is affected by the salience of the stimuli
for the subject) and when comparing different models. The ef-
ficiency of an excitatory conditioning can be roughly defined as
the inverse of the number of trials necessary to increase the as-
sociative strength from 0 to, say, 0.9 λ. This concept is subject-
dependent and may be used either to compare the learning of
different individuals within the same program or, when aver-
aging over individuals within the same experimental group, to
compare different learning programs.
Specifically, we obtain the following results. (i) We rec-
ognize Eq. (2) as one of the similarity maps defining Cantor
sets, which are an example of peculiar, totally disconnected sets
known as deterministic fractals. (ii) We calculate the Hausdorff
dimension dh of the set for Hull’s model and show that it de-
pends on the parameters α and β in such a way that the smaller
the dimension, the more efficient the conditioning. (iii) This
picture can be generalized to any other conditioning described
by iterative equations, giving explicit multidimensional exam-
ples that include Rescorla–Wagner, Mackintosh, and Pearce–
Hall models. As a further application to nonlinear sets, (iv) we
approximate Mackintosh theory (in the case of a single cue)
with a new model where the recursive equation describes slow
learning at intermediate trials; the dimension of this condition-
ing process is calculated and shown to be greater than in the
Hull model for the same asymptotic value of the parameters, in
agreement with (ii). Note that, in the presence of a single cue,
the learning rate is already enough to compare different individ-
uals or programs. One can see this by noting that the Hausdorff
dimension (8) only depends on the product of the saliences and
the smaller the salience, the larger the dimension. Neverthe-
less, when one goes beyond single-cue configurations and con-
siders more complicated settings (Section 4), it may become
progressively difficult or ambiguous to define effective learn-
ing rates. On the contrary, the Hausdorff dimension is always
a well-defined parameter that provides a quick way to compare
different individuals or models. Unfortunately, in practice, cal-
culating the Hausdorff dimension for complicated deterministic
processes may be as difficult as deciding on effective learning
rates. However, the fractal paradigm is not limited to the defini-
tion of a new parameter, and its advantages do not end here. (v)
The rethinking of learning processes in geometric terms will
allow us to reinterpret conditioning as a mixture of excitatory
and inhibitory processes rather than a black-or-white selection
of either. The degree of mixing will be determined by the value
of the Hausdorff dimension (Section 6).
(vi) Also, we generalize the construction to random fractals,
which are essential to describe experimental designs of Pavlo-
vian conditioning where the characteristic of the stimuli are de-
termined by random algorithms or the US is not presented at
all trials (partial reinforcement). The Hausdorff dimension of
the Cantor set is independent of the US intensity and it does not
fully capture the efficiency of a process. This is obvious from
Eq. (8) but (vii) we also give the counterexample of a partial-
reinforcement program (know to be “less conditioning” than
continuous reinforcement), where λ = 0 in some of the trial
but α and β (hence, dh) are kept fixed throughout. Here the
efficiency (the Hausdorff dimension, a pointwise geometric in-
dicator) is less important than the determination of the geomet-
ric shape of the fractal, which offers a more global and useful
perspective than the number dh. In fact, (viii) the mappings
generating the fractal give a prediction on the learning curve:
there will be plateaux in the curve with such and such distri-
bution determined by the random algorithm employed to pick
the value of the parameters at each trial. Different randomiza-
tions of Hull’s model will illustrate the point. Finally, (ix) we
make a preliminary connection with some results in the cogni-
tive literature on performance variability, which was found to
follow a multifractal pattern. With all due caution in comparing
widely different paradigms, we simulate performance variabil-
ity of internal origin by a Pavlovian conditioning model where
the salience of the stimuli slightly changes at each trial, accord-
ing to a random algorithm. Since dh = dh(αβ) only depends
on “internal” parameters determined by the type of subject and
the type of stimuli presented, under a cognitive-interactionist
perspective the Hausdorff dimension can be reinterpreted as the
part of the efficiency of the process due to the characteristics of
the subject in relation to the stimuli presented. Again, fractal
geometry has the potential to open a new door of analysis.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we recall
some basic aspects of deterministic fractals. In Section 3, we
apply this formalism to Hull’s associative model of Pavlovian
conditioning. Section 4 is devoted to the generalization of this
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one-dimensional case to more realistic models with many cues
or deterministically varying parameters (CS salience, US mag-
nitude), such as Rescorla–Wagner (Section 4.1), Mackintosh
and Pearce–Hall (Section 4.2), and a new nonlinear model akin
to Mackintosh (Section 4.3). Random fractals are the subject of
Section 5; flexible conditioning programs are discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, where the fractal construction is extended to the very
important case of random sets; a digression on cognitive experi-
ments unveiling a multifractal pattern in task performance vari-
ability and its possible relation with our findings is discussed in
Section 5.2. Section 6 briefly explores some applications of the
fractal picture, both to the practical understanding of condition-
ing processes and to experimental predictions about response
variability. Conclusions and future directions are in Section 7.
1.1. Main message for psychologists
The presentation is rather mathematical since it borrows a
few concepts from fractal geometry (Falconer, 2003). This may
considerably disorient part of the target readership of this paper,
namely, psychologists with a limited mathematical background.
For this reason, we summarize here and in human language the
core message of this work.
• Models of learning can be looked upon in a unified way.
Under a change in perspective with respect to traditional
presentations, all influential models of Pavlovian condi-
tioning such as Hull’s, Rescorla–Wagner’s, and Mackin-
tosh’s can be understood as deterministic fractal sets. In
particular, the dimension (8) of the fractal set relates to the
efficiency (learning speed) of the associated conditioning
model. This perspective links the somewhat scientifically
isolated elementary learning models to the robust frame-
work of fractal geometry and illustrates the potential for
cross-disciplinary fertilization in psychological science.
• Within the same framework, all deterministic condition-
ing models (which uniquely predict a certain association
strength and stimulus saliences at any given trial) can
be generalized to random models where the learning rate
(saliences) and, consequently, the subject response fluctu-
ate from trial to trial and one can only make probabilis-
tic predictions. We will construct several examples. The
key point is that, when regarded as a fractal, learning pro-
cesses with a random component do not generate all pos-
sible values of associative strength, but only a subset of
values. This subset is a random fractal. Efficient and fast
conditioning is characterized as a “discontinuous” process
with long hops between one point in the acquisition curve
and the next. Under these conditions, inhibition is a com-
pletely separated process which does not interfere with ac-
quisition. On the other hand, there seems to be a bit of
inhibition in slow excitatory conditioning. This statement
will be made mathematically precise.
• From the point of view of empirical research, the refor-
mulation of known conditioning models as deterministic
fractals does not add new predictions. In this respect, re-
ordering thoughts in terms of fractal geometry may in-
terest the theoretician and the epistemologist, but leave
the experimentalist skeptical about its practical usefulness.
However, the fractal interpretation of randommodels does
make a characteristic prediction about response variability
(Section 6), which must be limited to the values of asso-
ciative strength included in the fractal set. Concretely, we
expect a specific general trend of response variability for
a subject undergoing a training program equivalent to a
random fractal, where the US is not present at all trials or
the CS has variable salience. The learning curve in these
two situations is depicted, respectively, in Figs. 4 and 7.
These features can be easily checked, even qualitatively,
in laboratory experiments and the present work lays the
theoretical ground for such a test.
2. Fractals and the Cantor set
Let
S1(x) = a1x + b1 , S2(x) = a2x + b2 , (4)
be two similarity maps, where 0 < a1,2 < 1 (called similarity
ratios) and b1,2 (called shift parameters) are real constants and
x ∈ I is a point in the unit interval I = [0, 1]. The rationale be-
hind the term “similarity” (not to be confused with other usages
in psychology) will be explained shortly. The image Si(A) of
a subset A ⊂ I is the set of all points S1(x) where x ∈ A. A
Cantor set or Cantor dust C is given by the union of the image
of itself under the two similarity maps (4), C = S1(C) ∪ S2(C).
For instance, the ternary (or middle-third) Cantor set C3 (Can-
tor, 1883) has a1 = 1/3 = a2, b1 = 2/3, and b2 = 0:
S1(x) =
1
3
x + 2
3
, S2(x) =
1
3
x . (5)
The above definition of C is implicit but there exists also an
explicit definition: letting S (I) := S1(I) ∪ S2(I) be the trans-
formation on the interval I (the standard symbol “:=” indicates
that the left-hand side is defined by the right-hand side) and be-
ing S n = S ◦ S ◦ · · · ◦ S the nth iterate of S (i.e., S applied n
times), then C = ∩+∞
n=0
S n(E). It can be shown that these two def-
initions are equivalent and generalizable to an arbitrarily large
but finite number of maps Sk (Falconer, 2003) (see also Sec-
tion 4). Moreover, for this generic iterated function system the
resulting set F (a deterministic fractal) always exists and is a
unique attractor.
The Cantor set C is shown in Fig. 1. At the first iteration, the
interval [0, 1] is rescaled by 1/3 and duplicated in two copies:
one copy (corresponding to the image ofS2) at the leftmost side
of the unit interval and the other one (corresponding to S1) at
the rightmost side. In other words, one removes the middle third
of the interval I. In the second iteration, each small copy of I
is again contracted by 1/3 and duplicated, i.e., one removes the
middle third of each copy thus producing four copies 9 times
smaller than the original; and so on. Iterating infinitely many
times, one obtains C3, a dust of points sprinkling the line. The
3
n=1
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Figure 1: The ternary Cantor set for n = 6 iterations of the maps (5). Inter-
preted as a representation of the Hull model of Pavlovian conditioning, the line
[0, 1] is the range of possible values of the associative strength V developed by
the subject and n is the trial number. The thin red curve is the learning curve
connecting the points Vn = 0, 2/3, 8/9, 26/27, . . . and it corresponds to an exci-
tatory conditioning process where V1 = 0 (no association at the start of the first
trial) and Vn tends to λ = 1 progressively. The thin blue curve corresponds to
inhibition or extinction, where V1 = 1 and Vn tends to λ = 0. In the text, we dis-
cuss also conditioned inhibition. (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
set is self-similar inasmuch as, if we zoom in by a multiple of 3,
we will observe exactly the same structure. Thus is explained
the name “similarity”: the maps Sk make smaller copies of the
set which are identical to the original except for their relative
size.
It is easy to determine the dimensionality of the Cantor set C.
Since this dust does not cover the whole line, it has less than one
dimension. Naively, one might expect that the dimension of C
is zero, since it is the collection of disconnected points (which
are zero-dimensional). However, there are “too many” points
of C on I and, as it turns out, the dimension of the set is a real
number between 0 and 1. In particular, given N similarity maps
all with ratio 0 < a < 1, the similarity dimension or capacity of
the set is
dc(C) := −
lnN
ln a
. (6)
This formula is valid for an exactly self-similar set made of
N copies of itself, each of size a. Note that a = N−1/dc :
the smaller the size a, the smaller the copies at each itera-
tion and the smaller the dimensionality of the set. In the case
of the middle-third Cantor set, N = 2 and a = 1/3, so that
dc = ln 2/ ln 3 ≈ 0.63. Sets with noninteger dimensionality
are called fractals, a term coined by Mandelbrot (1967). There
are other important geometric indicators used in fractal geom-
etry, such as the box-counting dimension1 and the Hausdorff
dimension dh. For the class of fractals we will consider here,
1For a set F embedded in a D-dimensional space, the box-counting dimen-
sion is db := − limδ→0 ln N(δ)/ ln δ, where N(δ) is the minimum number of
n-balls, n 6 D with radius δ (or n-cubes of edge length δ; the choice of the
covering set is irrelevant) centered at points in F and such that they cover F
(i.e., each point in F lies in at least one ball). The number N(δ) increases as δ
decreases, approaching the behavior N(δ) ∼ δ−db as δ → 0. Intuitively, a set
with many irregularities requires more balls for being covered, and their number
increases faster than expected; an example from the real world is an irregular
porous surface, for which db > 2 (Pfeifer & Avnir, 1984). On the other hand, a
surface with “too many holes” may require less balls than a smooth one.
they are equal to the capacity (Falconer, 2003). The Hausdorff
dimension2 is one of the most popular among the fractal dimen-
sions and can be calculated for sets [or even spacetimes! See,
e.g., Calcagni (2016) and references therein] much more gen-
eral than those we will consider here. For this reason, we will
often refer to dh together with (or rather than) dc. Thanks to the
equivalence dh = dc for the Cantor set (Falconer, 2003), we will
only need the definition (6) in what follows, thus avoiding the
delicate technicalities involved in dh.
3. Geometric interpretation of the Hull and Rescorla–
Wagner models
Let us now apply these results, which are quite standard in
fractal geometry, to simple cases of the Hull and Rescorla–
Wagner models: (a) excitation, (b) extinction, and (c) inhibi-
tion. We consider two conditioning experiments, one where the
CS is an excitatory stimulus (λ , 0, the US always follows the
CS) and another where the same stimulus is inhibitory (λ = 0,
the US never follows the CS). For instance, the CS can be a
sound or a light and the US food or a discharge. Interpreting
the association strength Vn as the point in the nth iteration of a
set and comparing Eqs. (2) and (4), we see that the similarity
ratio and shift parameter in the Hull model (one CS) is
a1 = a2 = a = 1 − αβ , b1 = αβλ , b2 = 0 . (7)
The imagesS1(I) and S2(I) correspond to the set of association
strengths measured in, respectively, excitatory and inhibitory
conditioning. We can pair the Hull and Rescorla–Wagner mod-
els with a Cantor set C = S1(C) ∪ S2(C) with parameters (7).
In the example of Fig. 1, 1 − αβ = 1/3, which can be obtained
with β = 1 (maximum salience of the US) and α = 2/3 ≈ 0.66
(a highly salient CS).
The actual excitatory conditioning process (a) is shown by
the red learning curve in Fig. 1 [touching upon the S1(I) branch
with initial condition V1 = 0], while the extinction curve is
shown in blue [touching the S2(I) branch with initial condition
V1 = 1]. In the case of extinction (b), we can consider a two-
phase experiment. The first phase is excitatory with a given
CS, corresponding to the red curve. Then, the n = 1 point of
2To measure the geometry of a set F ⊂ RD, one can extend the same
idea of the box-counting dimension to the case of a minimal covering of F
with covering sets of different size. Let |U | = sup{∆(x, y) : x, y ∈ U} be
the diameter of a set U ⊂ RD , i.e., the greatest distance ∆(x, y) between two
points in U . A δ-cover of F is a countable or finite collection of sets {Ui}
of diameter at most δ that cover F : F ⊂
⋃
i Ui, with 0 6 |Ui| 6 δ for
all i. If s > 0 is a real non-negative parameter, one can define ̺s
H
(F ) :=
limδ→0 inf
{∑
i |Ui |
s : {Ui} is a δ-cover of F
}
. This limit exists (it can also be
0 or +∞) and is a measure, the s-dimensional Hausdorff measure of F . The
Hausdorff measure obeys the scaling property ̺s
H
(λx) = λs̺s
H
(x), where λ > 0
is the scale factor of a dilation x → λx. One can show that ̺s
H
is nonincreasing
with s and there exists a critical value of s at which the measure jumps from
+∞ to 0. This is the Hausdorff (or Hausdorff–Besicovitch) dimension of F
(Hausdorff, 1918): dh(F ) := inf{s : ̺
s(F ) = 0} = sup{s : ̺s(F ) = +∞}. The
Hausdorff measure diverges for s < dh, is zero for s > dh, and can be 0, +∞,
or finite at s = dh. Roughly speaking, the Hausdorff dimension is the scaling
of the volume of the covering sets with respect to their linear size. More details
can be found in Falconer (2003).
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the blue curve corresponds to the first trial in a second phase
of training where the association strength VCS relates the ab-
sence of the US (λ = 0) with the same CS used in phase 1, so
that VCS decreases from 1 to zero. In the case of an inhibitory
conditioning process (c), the red curve of phase 1 describes
the association strength VCS1 when pairing a given conditioned
stimulus CS1 to the US. In phase 2 (λ = 0), we pair a second
stimulus CS2 to CS1 and the blue curve runs over trials where
the associative strength VCS1+CS2 of the combined conditioned
stimuli (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner & Rescorla, 1972)
decreases to zero. This is standard inhibitory conditioning. Al-
ternatively, one can consider a backward pairing between the
US and a previously untrained stimulus CS−. Then, we iden-
tify the coordinate V =: V˜ + 1 in the figure with the association
strength V˜ , shifted by 1, of CS−. The blue curve then runs from
V˜ = 0 to V˜ = −1 (perfect inhibition). Trace conditioning fol-
lows a similar rule.
The rest of the set (in black) represents experiments where
trials with excitatory pairing (single CS followed by the US)
are mixed with trials where the US does not follow the CS.
The learning curve will change according to the session pattern
(positive or negative contingency of the US) and one will have
infinitely many possible experiments or natural situations with
non-optimal learning.
By interpreting a model of Pavlovian conditioning as a col-
lection of processes taking place on a fractal set, we gain a num-
ber of insights that can be described in a very minimalistic but
effective fashion. For instance, the abstract3 notion that exci-
tation and inhibition are the two extremes, with opposite sign,
of the same process (Rescorla, 1967) translates into a precise
mathematical statement. For the Hull and Rescorla–Wagner
models, excitation and extinction correspond to processes liv-
ing on, respectively, the two complementary branchesS1(I) and
S2(I) of the Cantor set with initial condition V
excit
1
= 0 and
Vextin
1
= 1.
Also, the Hausdorff dimension of C is equal to the capacity,
which is found from Eqs. (6) and (7):
dh(C) = dc(C) = −
ln 2
ln(1 − αβ)
. (8)
Another but more rigorous way to find the Hausdorff dimension
is via the summation formula (Falconer, 2003)
1 = a
dh
1
+ a
dh
2
= 2(1 − αβ)dh , (9)
where in the last step we used the similarity ratios (7). This
formula is more general than that of the capacity and can be
applied also to the case of more than two similarities acting on
a D-dimensional space RD,
∑K
k=1 a
dh
k
= 1.
In the example of Fig. 1, dc = ln 2/ ln 3 ≈ 0.63. The profile
(8) is shown in Fig. 2.
3In the real world, excitation and inhibition are not symmetrical, since
any inhibitory process must depend on preceding excitation. However, in the
present case we are interested in a reformulation of the Hull and Rescorla–
Wagner mathematical models.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
ΑΒ
dH
Figure 2: The Hausdorff dimension (or capacity) (8) (solid line), which mea-
sures the efficiency of conditioning. The dashed line dh = 1 is shown for refer-
ence. The region where dh > 1 is excluded in fractal geometry but it acquires a
meaning in our context.
Note that dh is independent of the magnitude λ of the US but
depends on the learning-rate parameters α and β, the salience
of the CS and of the US. We can identify two regimes:
• For 0 < αβ < 0.5, the fractal is degenerate, in the sense
that it fills the whole line. A lower salience of the CS in-
creases the similarity ratio a = 1−αβ and produces longer
segments, leading to a Cantor set with a larger dimension.
Strictly speaking, although dh > 1, the dimension of the
set is just equal to 1, since the continuous line fixes, so
to speak, the maximum occupation of points and it can-
not be overflown. However, conditioning makes sense in
this region and dh is a good learning index even in this
range of values. The latter is consistent both with a CS
with very low salience α (resulting in slow conditioning)
and with the expectation that, at the beginning of the train-
ing, a very salient CS would actually compete with the US
(very small β versus relatively large α) rather than being
a neutral stimulus. For β = 1 and the typical CS salience
α = 0.5, one has dh = 1.
• For αβ > 0.5, we have 0 < dh < 1. The closer the value of
αβ to 1, the larger the denominator of Eq. (8): as αβ → 1
and 1 − αβ → 0, we move towards the limit dh → 0. The
interpretation of this feature in terms of Pavlovian condi-
tioning is straightforward. The larger the salience of the
US, the more efficient the conditioning and the fewer the
trials needed to achieve complete training. Perfect train-
ing corresponds to infinitely many iterations, but efficient
training requires less iterations to reach optimal learning.
But the fewer the trials, the “fewer the points” in C, which
means the smaller the dimension dh.
We have thus established that the capacity or Hausdorff dimen-
sion of the fractal associated with the conditioning model de-
creases with the increase in the efficiency of the training. We
conjecture that this conclusion may be valid for any other con-
ditioning that can be defined by one or more iterative equations.
Of course, different models will correspond to different fractals,
not necessarily Cantor dusts.
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Interestingly, our result (8) does not depend on the magni-
tude λ of the US, which is another factor affecting the efficiency
of a conditioning. We must conclude that the capacity dimen-
sion is insufficient to fully characterize the efficiency, which is
a λ-dependent concept. However, it is a first step towards a
geometric classification of conditioning methods.
4. Deterministic generalizations
The purpose of this section is to illustrate, without entering
into too many details, the potential that the powerful techniques
of fractal geometry can express in the context of learning theory
and behavioral models. In Section 3, we considered treatments
with a single conditioned stimulus associated with the strength
parameter Vn governed by the linear equation (2). We translated
both features into two mathematical concepts. (A) Having only
one CS allowed us to describe the learning process in terms
of a set C that can be completely embedded in one dimension,
i.e., a line. (B) The linearity of Eq. (2) led to the linear map-
pings (4); a mappingS(x) is linear when it only has the constant
and the x term as in (4). Mappings with terms proportional to
x2, x3, . . . , or with entangled variables appearing in mixed terms
xy, xy2, x2y, . . . , are called nonlinear. However, in mathemat-
ics and physics there exist many one-dimensional4 fractals that
are described by nonlinear (rather than linear) mappings, thus
breaking condition (B). Also, the majority of fractals do not
fit into a line and they need a higher-dimensional embedding
space, thus breaking both (A) and (B).
Mathematically, nonlinear mappings are the most natural
way to generalize the Cantor construction to generic one-
dimensional deterministic fractals F . Just like the Cantor set,
deterministic fractals can be defined as the union of the image
of several maps, F = S1(F ) ∪ S2(F ) ∪ · · · ∪ SK(F ), but now
the functions Sk(x), k = 1, . . . ,K, are contractions nonlinear in
x. A map S is called a contraction if there exists a constant
0 < a < 1 such that |S(y) − S(x)| 6 a|y − x|. When the in-
equality is saturated (i.e., |S(y) − S(x)| = a|y − x|), we have a
similarity, of which the formulæ in (4) are an example [in Eq.
(5), a = 1/3].
Many dynamical system studied in chaos theory are encoded
into nonlinear maps. Here, fractals arise in a rather subtle way
[see, e.g., Chap. 13 of Falconer (2003)]. Consider, for instance,
the function xn+1 = f (xn) = gxn(1 − xn) on the real line, where
g > 0 is a constant. This is called the logistic map and it was
first proposed to model the population growth of certain animal
species. A system like this is called chaotic because its behavior
is strongly affected by the value of g, and even tiny changes in
g can lead to very different behaviors. For some values, the dy-
namics can be highly sensitive to the initial conditions, so that
acting with f on two points in the same neighborhood quickly
4Here and in the following, with one-dimensional and multidimensional we
refer to the topological dimension D of the embedding space RD , i.e., the num-
ber of independent variables entering the iterative equations defining the frac-
tal. Embedding space is the ambient “box” (a line, a plane, a three-dimensional
space, and so on) in which the fractal is imagined to live.
leads, after only a few iterations of f , to a very different evo-
lution. In particular, for g greater than some critical value g∗
the nonlinear Cantor set Cnl = S+(Cnl)∪S−(Cnl) defined by the
two mappings S±(x) = 1/2 ±
√
1/4 − x/g is a chaotic repeller
of f . A repeller of a dynamical system described by some f is a
set F , invariant under f [this means that f (F ) = F ], such that
points outside F are mapped away from it. The nonlinear Can-
tor set is invariant under the logistic map, that is, f [S±(x)] = x
for all x ∈ [0, 1]; it is not difficult to show that it is a chaotic re-
peller for f . From this example, one can appreciate two things:
that Cnl is defined by mappingsS±(x) nonlinear in x, and that it
arises as a special set of points in a dynamical system described
by the nonlinear logistic map f .
The logistic map and other one-dimensional nonlinear map-
pings f (x) used in biology and economics can be found in Fal-
coner (2003) and in the interpretative review by May (1976),
one of the early seminal papers on chaos theory. Examples of
multidimensional systems described by mappings mixing coor-
dinates nonlinearly, and where fractals appear as dynamical re-
pellers, are the “baker’s transformation”, He´non’s map, and the
solenoid (Falconer, 2003). Multidimensional chaotic systems
have applications not only in biology and economics, but also
in cryptographic systems (Millerioux & Mira, 1997; Rhouma
& Safya, 2006).
The correspondence between learning models and fractal ge-
ometry found in Section 3 was limited to Hull’s case. The ques-
tion we wish to ask ourselves is: Can we extend it further? Can
fractals in chaotic systems (such as those mentioned above) cor-
respond to some learning models in the psychological litera-
ture, or are they just mathematical complications with no prac-
tical interest? We argue in favor of a positive answer. In this
section, we discuss precisely these generalizations of the one-
dimensional condition (A) and of the linearity condition (B) to
multidimensional models described by many-variables recur-
sive equations (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). A simplified learning
scenario which is one-dimensional but describable by a nonlin-
ear equation will be presented in Section 4.3. Our contribution
here will be limited to recognize all these learning models as
multidimensional and/or nonlinear iterative systems. To show
that they are associated to fractals, or even to chaos, is highly
nontrivial, but the form of the iterative equations, the explicit re-
sults for the nonlinear approximation of Section 4.3, and other
arguments we will advocate below, strongly suggest that fractal
geometry waits just beyond the corner. Due to their complex-
ity, we will only sketch future possibilities for multidimensional
models, while we will describe the one-dimensional nonlinear
generalization in greater detail, showing that it is fractal.
4.1. Multidimensional systems: Rescorla–Wagner model
The generalization from fractals on the line to multidimen-
sional fractals captures situations where learning is described
by more than one internal variable. Simply put, instead of hav-
ing only one association strength related to one CS [the one-
dimensional condition (A)], we can consider many CSs each
with its own association strength (Rescorla–Wagner model) or
stimuli with varying salience (Mackintosh model) and magni-
tude (Pearce–Hall model).
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Let us examine first the case of many CS. The Rescorla–
Wagner model was proposed to describe the case of compound
stimuli, in which case the iterative evolution is more compli-
cated. For two cues A and B with salience αA and αB, one has
two iterative processes V
(A)
n and V
(B)
m , with Eq. (1) replaced by
∆V (A)n = αAβ[λ − (V
(A)
n−1
+ V
(B)
n−1
)] , (10a)
∆V (B)m = αBβ[λ − (V
(A)
m−1
+ V
(B)
m−1
)] . (10b)
Clearly, this extension of the single-CS case is highly non-
trivial if A and B are not presented together at all sessions.
Also, at different phases one might want to couple different
CSs with different USs. The above pair of equations would
then be augmented by another identical pair with a different
US with salience β˜ and asymptote (intensity) λ˜, and possibly a
different CS compound AB˜. Each conditioned stimulus CS(i),
i = 1, . . . ,D, corresponds to an association strength V (i), which
parametrizes the ith direction of the D-dimensional embedding
space wherein the “Rescorla–Wagner fractal” lives.
Systems of recurrence equations with D variables V
(i)
n can
be much more difficult to solve analytically than stand-alone
expressions such as (2), depending on how such variables are
mutually entangled. Conceptually, there should be no prob-
lem in extending our geometric interpretation and one may still
be able to construct fractal sets by joining excitatory and in-
hibitory branches. However, the proof of this involves either
the product of D one-dimensional fractals or the study of D-
dimensional nondecomposable fractals, both of which cases re-
quire a machinery more sophisticated than the one developed
here for one-dimensional fractals (Falconer, 2003). Neverthe-
less, we have found a simple result for the case where all CS are
presented simultaneously. We begin by observing that the two-
cue Rescorla–Wagner model (10) is solvable analytically in this
simplified setting. Consider the phase of an experiment where
both cues A and B are presented at the same time and at each
trial, cue A starting with V
(A)
1
= 0 and cue B with some generic
value 0 6 V
(B)
1
6 λ. Then, from Eq. (10) we can exactly solve
the system V
(A)
n = V
(A)
n−1
+ ∆V
(A)
n , V
(B)
n = V
(B)
n−1
+ ∆V
(B)
n :
V (A)n =
(λ − V
(B)
1
)αA{1 − [1 − (αA + αB)β]
n−1}
αA + αB
,
V (B)n =
V
(B)
1
αA + αB{λ − (λ − V
(B)
1
)[1 − (αA + αB)β]
n−1}
αA + αB
.
Each of these two solutions can combine separately into the
linear recursive equations
V (A)n = [1 − (αA + αB)β]V
(A)
n−1
+ (λ − V
(B)
1
)αAβ , (11a)
V (B)n = [1 − (αA + αB)β]V
(B)
n−1
+ (λαB + V
(B)
1
αA)β. (11b)
Therefore, the system (10) with coupled variables V
(A)
n and V
(B)
n
has been recast as the pair (11) of independent similarity maps.
Coupling Eq. (11a) with its extinction counterpart and recalling
Eq. (8), we obtain a Cantor set CA with dimension dh(CA) =
− ln 2/ ln[1 − (αA + αB)β]. Doing the same with Eq. (11b), we
get another copy CB of the same set with dimension dh(CB) =
dh(CA). Recalling that the Hausdorff dimension of the product
of two Cantor sets is the sum of their dimensions (Falconer,
2003), we conclude that the two-cue Rescorla–Wagner model
is associated with a set CA × CB with dimension
dh(CA × CB) = dh(CA) + dh(CB) = −
2 ln 2
ln[1 − (αA + αB)β]
.
Now, notice that the inclusion of an arbitrary number D of cues
would not change the above argument: the only change would
be in the initial conditionsV
(i)
1
, which would affect the constants
bk in the similarity maps Sk(x) = akx + bk. Then, it is easy
to see that the multi-cue Rescorla–Wagner model with all CS
presented at each trial is associated with the set CRW =
∏D
i=1 Ci
(the product of D Cantor sets) with Hausdorff dimension
dh(CRW) =
D∑
i=1
dh(Ci) = −
D ln 2
ln
[
1 −
(∑D
i=1 αi
)
β
] . (12)
This formula is valid only if
∑
i αi < 1/β. For instance, for a
US with β = 1 and two cues, it must be αA + αB < 1.
For experimental designs with nonsimultaneous presentation
of all cues at all trials, with cues with too large salience, or with
different USs, this simplified model breaks down and the analy-
sis can become considerably difficult. In general, the Hausdorff
dimension of the product of many sets cannot be determined
exactly and the only thing one can do is to bound it from above
and below by certain combinations of the dimensions of the sets
(Falconer, 2003).
4.2. Multidimensional systems: Mackintosh and Pearce–Hall
models
There are other examples of multidimensional systems. It is
well-known that the Rescorla–Wagner model suffers from sev-
eral limitations (Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). Among
them, we recall that it predicts the extinction of conditioned
inhibition (which does not occur actually) and it regards extinc-
tion as an unlearning process (i.e., the blue and red curves in
Fig. 1 are perfectly specular). Thus, it cannot explain either
spontaneous recovery (when a CR that had been extinguished
reappears) or other effects such as preconditioning exposure to
the CS [i.e., latent inhibition, which may occur also in con-
junction with a reinforcer (Hall & Pearce, 1979)], augmenta-
tion (or counter-blocking), first-trial unblocking (Mackintosh,
1975b), or unblocking by the surprising omission of part of a
compound US (Dickinson, Hall, & Mackintosh, 1976). More-
over, the blocking effect on a CS2 (by a CS1 associated with
the US in a preliminary training phase) is explained as the ab-
sence of novelty in the US after its pairing with the CS1, but this
interpretation has been ruled out in an experiment by Mackin-
tosh and Turner (1971). Latent inhibition was accounted for
by Wagner (1978), while first-trial unblocking and unblocking
by omission were explained by Mackintosh model of attention
(Mackintosh, 1975a), according to which blocking occurs be-
cause predictive but redundant stimuli such as CS2 are ignored.
Finally, Pearce and Hall (1980) proposed a model that could
encompass all these cases and explain latent inhibition as well
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as various phenomena of unblocking. These and other elemen-
tal theories of associative learning are reviewed by Le Pelley
(2004) and Wagner and Vogel (2009); some have been devel-
oped more recently (Esber & Haselgrove, 2011).
Most of these proposals require a quantitativemodification of
the Rescorla–Wagner model by replacing all constant α’s with
trial-dependent parameters αn that change with the subject’s ex-
perience. In the case of Mackintosh model, the rate of change
is assumed to follow a linear law. For instance, given two cues
A and B, one has
∆α(A)n = γA
(∣∣∣λ − V (B)
n−1
∣∣∣ −
∣∣∣λ − V (A)
n−1
∣∣∣
)
(13)
and an analogous expression for ∆α
(B)
n , where γA is a con-
stant. The recursive law governing the evolution of V (A) is
∆V
(A)
n = α
(A)
n−1
β[λ − V
(A)
n−1
] and the influence of other stimuli is
encoded exclusively in the way α(A) varies, via Eq. (13). This
is in contrast with the Rescorla–Wagner prescription, accord-
ing to which the size of the associative change depends on the
strength of all the stimuli, ∆V
(A)
n = αAβ[λ −
∑
i V
(i)
n−1
].
According toMackintosh model, attention is competitive and
is based on relative predictivity of different cues. For illustrative
purposes only, here we are interested in a simpler model with
less variables (i.e., dimensions D of the dynamical system; in
the two-cue model (13), D = 3). The outcome will be unrealis-
tic for several reasons, but we stress that the following simpli-
fied model should be regarded as a sketch of the possibility that
the multidimensional iterative systems employed in condition-
ing psychology can admit a fractal reinterpretation. Moreover,
this simplified “Mackintosh” model (quotation marks are due)
will prepare the ground to a more interesting generalization,
namely, to nonlinear systems.
With this disclaimer in mind, if we ignore stimulus B we get
a D = 2 single-cue case, which is better tractable:
αn = αn−1 + ∆αn = αn−1 − γ|λ − Vn−1| , (14)
which should be coupled with Eq. (2). Here γ > 0 is a con-
stant. This system has a two-dimensional embedding where
the D = 2 directions are the association strength V and the CS
salience α. Although there is no cue competition and we cannot
thus apply the actual Mackintosh model, the other main tenet of
Mackintosh is implemented, namely, that α varies with the sub-
ject’s experience and depends on the correlation of the CS (the
only cue in a phase of an experiment) with the reinforcement
(Mackintosh, 1975a). In this particular case, α decreases while
the associative strength increases towards the asymptote, con-
trary to Mackintosh two-cue model where α typically increases
for a cue which is a better predictor of the outcome than are all
other presented cues. We were unable to find explicit solutions
Vn and αn but it is easy to see that, compared with the Hull
learning curve (3) with α = α1, this model predicts a slower
learning during intermediate trials (Fig. 3).
The model (14) is a hybrid between Mackintosh and Pearce–
Hall. Also the Pearce–Hall model assumes that the effective-
ness α of a CS changes with its predictive strength V but,
contrary to Mackintosh theory, the magnitude or intensity of
the US now varies with the experience (Pearce & Hall, 1980):
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Figure 3: Learning progression for excitatory conditioning with V1 = 0, β = 1
and λ = 1. Light-gray circles: Hull’s model (3) for α = 0.7. Black squares:
“Mackintosh” single-cue model (2) and (14) for α1 = 0.7 and γ = 0.099 (the
asymptote is αn → 0.5503). Gray diamonds: the nonlinear model (16) with
λ˜ = λ, αmin = 0.5503, and αmax = 0.7.
αn = |λn−1 − Vn−1|, where the US magnitude is bound to lie in
the range 0 6 λn 6 1. In a variant of the model which fixes
some issues of the original proposal, this expression is replaced
by αn = γ|λn−1 − Vn−1| + (1 − γ)αn−1, where 0 < γ 6 1 (Pearce,
Kaye, & Hall, 1982). This reflects the idea that stimuli always
have the possibility to gain access to the subject’s processing,
but less surprising stimuli will have limited access. The recur-
sive law for αn is combined with ∆Vn = βαnλn, to give a three-
dimensional system (D = 3) with three directions parametrized
by V , α, and λ. Without any specific iteration rule for λn [ab-
sent in the original paper by Pearce and Hall (1980)], we cannot
solve the system analytically. However, when λn is approxi-
mately constant we get a single-cue setting with decreasing α,
just like the model (14).
Having observed that the Rescorla–Wagner, Mackintosh, and
Pearce–Hall models are multidimensional iterative systems, it
remains to see that they correspond to fractals. As said in the
introduction of this section, this check lies out of the range of
the present investigation, which is exploratory in nature. How-
ever, it is very likely that an underlying fractal geometry exists,
for three reasons. First, from a visual inspection of the above
equations, but which could be revealing only for a mathemati-
cian. Second, because the simplified core of all these models,
Hull’s model, is already a neat example of fractal. Third, the
model presented in Section 4.3 approximates one of the multidi-
mensional models (Mackintosh’s) and is manifestly associated
with a fractal. The point is that generalizing a one-dimensional
model to many dynamical variables and/or to nonlinear map-
pings is not expected to change (and it does not, as shown be-
low) the geometry from fractal to smooth.
4.3. One-dimensional nonlinear systems: a nonlinear learning
model
A somewhat easier but still nontrivial possibility is to analyze
learning processes which are one-dimensional but described by
nonlinear recurrence equations. The following example can
help the reader to appreciate that such abstract constructions
can have direct applications to psychology. We present (to the
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best of our knowledge, for the first time) a simplified model of
variable salience which approximates single-cue “Mackintosh”
model. Equation (14) is replaced by
αn = αmax − (αmax −αmin)
Vn
λ
, 0 < αmin < αmax 6 1. (15)
The parameter αn depends on the value Vn of the association
strength at the moment of the trial. Using Eq. (1), it is easy
to see that (15) is an approximation of (14) when αn does not
vary much during conditioning (αmax ∼ αmin), corresponding to
a small parameter
γ ≃ (αmax − αmin)
β
λ
≪ 1 .
In excitatory conditioning, when n = 1 (first trial), V1 = 0 and
the salience of the CS has some default value 0 < α1 = αmax < 1
which depends on the nature of the CS and on its salience for
the subject. As the excitatory training proceeds, the salience of
the CS approaches the asymptotic value αmin < α1. In the case
of extinction, the association strength decreases from V1 = λ to
zero and the salience of the CS grows from its minimal value
α1 = αmin up to αmax. Therefore, if the subject is presented
with a novel stimulus, the salience will decrease from αmax to
αmin (V increasing from 0 to λ), while in the case of extinction
(V decreasing from λ to 0) the converse will happen.5 Plug-
ging Eq. (15) into (2), we obtain a nonlinear law for excitatory
conditioning:
Vn = (1 − αn−1β)Vn−1 + αn−1βλ
= αmaxβλ + [1 + β(αmin − 2αmax)]Vn−1
+(αmax − αmin)
β
λ
V2n−1. (16)
For small γ, this is a good approximation of single-cue Mack-
intosh model (Fig. 3). To resume, the nonlinear model (16) re-
duces to the Hull/Rescorla–Wagner model only at lowest order
in the approximation, when αn = α is exactly constant. How-
ever, in Eq. (15) αn has a linear dependence on V , which trans-
lates into the nonlinear term O(V2) in the evolution equation
(16) for the association strength. Figure 3 clearly shows that
the nonlinear model is, on one hand, a very good approxima-
tion of single-cue Mackintosh’s for a slowly varying α (small
parameter γ; gray diamonds overlap completely with black
squares) and, on the other hand, distinctly different with respect
to Hull model (light-gray circles). The conditioning described
by Eq. (16) differs from other nonlinear models described in
the past (Brandon, Vogel, & Wagner, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004).
In particular, Le Pelley’s hybrid model (Le Pelley, 2004) is an
extension, rather than an approximation, of Mackintosh theory.
The excitation branch S˜1(I) of the associated fractal (in this
case, a nonlinear Cantor set we will dub C˜) is given by the con-
traction (16), while the extinction branch S˜2(I) is given by set-
ting λ = 0 into Eq. (2) and then plugging (15) therein:
Vn = (1 − αn−1β)Vn−1
= (1 − βαmax)Vn−1 + (αmax − αmin)
β
λ
V2n−1 . (17)
5For inhibitory conditioning, either one makes the change of variables V =
V˜ + 1 explained below Eq. (7) or one considers the compound case (13).
Then, the set C˜ = S˜1(C˜) ∪ S˜2(C˜) is given by the two mappings
S˜1(x) = αmaxβλ +
[
1 + β(αmin − 2αmax)
]
x
+(αmax − αmin)
β
λ
x2 , (18a)
S˜2(x) = (1 − βαmax)x + (αmax − αmin)
β
λ
x2 . (18b)
When αmax = αmin, we recover S1 and S2. Notice that, in gen-
eral, the appearance of two different conditioning laws for ex-
citatory and inhibitory processes is nothing new and it was al-
ready employed in Pearce and Hall (1980). The novelty here,
apart from the specific form of Eq. (18), is the geometric in-
terpretation of conditioning in terms of branches of a fractal.
As an application, we now show that the capacity of this set is
larger than the one of Hull’s model, thus giving a quantitative
estimate of the “uphill learning” depicted in Fig. 3.6 Although
it is not always possible to find the exact value of the dimen-
sion of a fractal, there are some powerful theorems that make
use of the properties of contractions. The reader uninterested in
technicalities can skip this part and go directly to Eq. (20).
The first step consists in checking whether the maps S˜k are
bi-Lipschitz, meaning that there exist two positive and finite
constants ak and bk such that bk|y − x| 6 |S˜k(y) − S˜k(x)| 6
ak|y − x|. In that case, ak = supx|S˜
′
k
(x)| and bk = infx|S˜
′
k
(x)|,
where a prime denotes the derivative with respect to x. For the
system (18), it is easy to find these constants. Since S˜′
1
(x) =
1+β(αmin−2αmax)+2(αmax−αmin)(β/λ)x, S˜
′
2
(x) = 1−βαmax+
2(αmax − αmin)(β/λ)x, αmax − αmin > 1, and 0 6 x 6 1, one
has that the highest and lowest (respectively sup and inf) value
of |S˜′
k
(x)| is attained at, respectively, x = 1 and x = 0. Then,
we find a1 = |1 + β(αmin − 2αmax) + 2β(αmax − αmin)/λ|, a2 =
|1 − βαmax + 2β(αmax − αmin)/λ|, b1 = |1 − β(2αmax − αmin)|,
and b2 = 1 − βαmax. For λ = 1 and assuming that there is not
much difference between the initial and final value of αn, these
expressions reduce to
a1 = 1 − βαmin , a2 = 1 + β(αmax − 2αmin), (19a)
b1 = 1 − β(2αmax − αmin) , b2 = 1 − βαmax. (19b)
In particular, for Hull’s model αmin = αmax = α and all the
coefficients collapse to 1 − βα. Next, we prove that the nonlin-
ear model is associated with a fractal. This check is important
because, if there is an underlying fractal, then by approxima-
tion also Mackintosh model corresponds to a fractal geome-
try, which yields support to the main claim of this section. To
show this, one must calculate the Hausdorff dimension and find
a noninteger value. One recalls that the Hausdorff dimension
of a fractal F = S1(F ) ∪ S2(F ) is bounded from above and
from below by sb 6 dh(F ) 6 sa, where sb and sa are two con-
stants determined implicitly by the relations [analogous to (9)]
b
sb
1
+b
sb
2
= 1 and a
sa
1
+a
sa
2
= 1 (Falconer, 2003). For linear map-
pings, sa = sb and these relations are sufficient to determine dh.
For nonlinear mappings, one can at least make an estimate of
the range of dh. For instance, consider the bi-Lipschitz maps
6The reason behind this name and the details of the approximation linking
Mackintosh’s model and Eq. (2) will be discussed in a separate publication.
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(18) with β = 1, λ = 1, αmin = 0.55 and αmax = 0.70 in
Eq. (19). Then, the parameters (19) are fully determined and
one finds 0.455 < dh(C˜) < 1.077. Taking an extra iteration
and the maps {S˜k ◦ S˜l : k, l = 1, 2}, this interval is refined to
0.508 < dh(C˜) < 0.932, while a third iteration with the maps
{S˜k ◦ S˜l ◦ S˜q : k, l, q = 1, 2} yields 0.546 < dh(C˜) < 0.857. A
fourth iteration with {S˜k ◦ S˜l ◦ S˜q ◦ S˜r : k, l, q, r = 1, 2} gives
0.572 < dh(C˜) < 0.814. It is not difficult to convince oneself
that 0.576 < dh(C˜) < 0.868, where inequalities are strict and
the lower and upper limit correspond to the Hausdorff dimen-
sion (8) of the ternary Cantor set with, respectively, α = 0.70
and α = 0.55. For general CS saliences αmin and αmax and a
fixed US salience β,
dh(Cα=αmax ) < dh(C˜) < dh(Cα=αmin) . (20)
Numerical iterative methods such as that above can shrink
this range considerably. Therefore, the nonlinear model de-
scribes less efficient learning than Hull’s when its US salience
is smaller than that of Hull’s models, and vice versa. This con-
clusion is obvious by looking at Fig. 3 but we have just made it
quantitative in a precise sense. The main point, however, is that
Eq. (20), which is a nontrivial consequence of the theorem cited
above, proves that the dimension of C˜ is noninteger. Since this
set is defined by the action of two contractions, one concludes
that C˜ is a deterministic fractal.
5. Random fractals
5.1. Random Cantor sets: varying programs
It is easy to generalize the construction of Sections 3 and 4
to other experiments. For instance, an asymmetric Cantor set is
obtained not only in the nonlinear model proposed above, but
also in the linear case if we choose different saliences α2 , α1
and β2 , β1 in the parameters (7) of Eq. (4). Also, if we let
any of the parameters λ, α, and β vary randomly in the interval
[0, 1] at each iteration, we would be in a situation where the
strength and appearance rate of the US is governed by a random
generator at each conditioning trial. Therefore, at each iteration
n there are four similarities (one pair S1,2 per interval),
S1,L,n(x) = a1,L,nx + b1,L,n ,
S2,L,n(x) = a2,L,nx + b2,L,n , (21a)
S1,R,n(x) = a1,R,nx + b1,R,n ,
S2,R,n(x) = a2,R,nx + b2,R,n , (21b)
the first pair acting on the left-hand interval (L) and the sec-
ond pair acting on the right-hand interval (R). In the case
of Pavlovian conditioning [Eq. (7)], a1,L,n = 1 − α1,L,nβ1,L,n,
b1,L,n = λ1,L,nα1,L,nβ1,L,n, and so on.
In the language of fractal geometry, this would be a ran-
dom fractal. We expect the conditioning-to-fractal correspon-
dence to hold only by considering both the excitatory and in-
hibitory branches at the same time (otherwise, the iterative pro-
cess would collapse the initial set I to a point). While the ideal
excitatory conditioning in a controlled environment is only a
portion of the sequence of iterations generating the fractal [in
the example of Fig. 1, from the interval (2/3, 1) to the point
V = 1], we can interpret the whole fractal as a description of
the most varied pairings one can find in Nature or in the labora-
tory between two given stimuli.
There are various ways to randomize a one-dimensional Can-
tor set. Here we discuss two.
• One is to divide each interval, starting as usual from I =
[0, 1], into three equal parts and remove some randomly
chosen (even none or all) (Falconer, 2003). Then, for each
branch (left L or right R) and at each iteration n, there are
eight options (Table 1): no subinterval removed (a1 = a2 =
1, b1 = b2 = 0), all intervals removed (a1 = a2 = b1 =
b2 = 0), only the central interval removed (a1 = a2 = 1/3,
b1 = 2/3, b2 = 0), only the leftmost interval removed
(a1 = b1 = 0, a2 = 2/3, b2 = 1/3), only the rightmost
interval removed (a2 = b2 = 0, a1 = 2/3, b1 = 1/3),
only the leftmost interval surviving (a1 = b1 = b2 = 0,
a2 = 1/3), only the central interval surviving (a1 = b1 =
0, a2 = 1/3, b2 = 1/3), and only the rightmost interval
surviving (a2 = b2 = b1 = 0, a1 = 1/3).
In the context of one-dimensional conditioning with con-
stant saliences (one CS, Hull model), this type of random-
ization is limited by the fact that the coefficients an and
bn are not completely independent (from now on, we keep
only iteration indices). β , 0 is fixed a priori (US salience
predetermined by the type of stimulus and subject) and
we can change αn only to the values 0 (absence of CS) or
one among the three possibilities αn = 1/β, 1/(3β), 2/(3β)
(an = 1 or 2/3 or 1/3, presence of CS with a given
salience; the case an = 1 is allowed only if β = 1,
which we can grant). This is because a CS with different
saliences (e.g., a light of different colors) is to be treated
as many different CSs. The randomizing algorithm can
only pick values λn accommodating with the value of bn,
i.e., either 0 (no US) or 1 (maximum magnitude or inten-
sity). Only when no CS is presented (an = 1) can λ get
any value between 0 and 1. All these cases are summa-
rized in Table 1. Clearly, the only combination that makes
sense in a single-cue psychological experiment is the first
and third line of the table (all subintervals or first and third
subinterval present). All the other cases but one are ex-
cluded because αβ is different in the mappings S1 and S2.
The all-or-no-subinterval case (first and second line of the
table) is ruled out because it represents no conditioning at
all. A set Cpr1 resulting from the only surviving proce-
dure, together with its excitatory and extinction learning
curves, are shown in Fig. 4. This corresponds to a con-
trolled experimental design with partial reinforcement on
a randomized schedule (hence the subscript “pr” in Cpr1),
where the CS is either absent or present and the US is ei-
ther absent or present (with the same intensity except in
trials where the CS is absent).
The Hausdorff dimension of a random Cantor set is given
almost surely (i.e., with probability 1) by the expectation
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Iteration of an interval a1 b1 α1β1 λ1 a2 b2 α2β2 λ2
1 0 0 any 1 0 0 any
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1
3
2
3
2
3
1 1
3
0 2
3
0
0 0 1 0 2
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
3
0 1
3
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
3
0 2
3
0
0 0 1 0 1
3
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
1 0 0 1 0
Table 1: Allowed values of the parameters of random Hull’s model in the case of partial reinforcement (random fractal).
0 1
n=7
n=6
n=5
n=4
n=3
n=2
n=1
Figure 4: A random ternary Cantor set Cpr1 corresponding to a randomized
Hull model of the first type for n = 7 iterations. The thin red (blue) solid curve
is the learning curve of excitatory conditioning (respectively, extinction) in a
partial reinforcement program. Dashed curves are the learning curves in the
deterministic model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
value of Eq. (9) 〈a
dh
1
+a
dh
2
〉 = 1 (Falconer, 2003). In the de-
terministic case, angular brackets are removed and Eqs. (8)
and (9) are recovered. For the similarity ratios (7), we get
2〈(1 − αβ)dh〉 = 1 and the efficiency of conditioning is in-
creased by decreasing the Hausdorff dimension, that is, by
increasing αβ towards 1 in average. As we already com-
mented, dh is λ-independent and does not capture all as-
pects of efficiency. For instance, in a program with partial
reinforcement we can get the same dh as in a determinist
program with continuous reinforcement (US presented at
all trials), but it is known that performance is lower in the
first. This phenomenon is clearly shown in Fig. 4: the less
fragmented is the fractal, the slower the learning. Thus,
examination of the detailed properties of the fractal can
say more than what said by the global indicator dh.
• Another possibility is to replace each interval In at the nth
iteration with two subintervals IL,n+1 and IR,n+1 of ran-
dom length, such that the length ratios |IL,n+1|/|In| and
|IR,n+1|/|In| have independent and identical probability dis-
tributions for each n. If IL,n+1 and IR,n+1 abut, respectively,
the left- and the right-hand of In, then one obtains the set
like the one depicted in Fig. 5, but this condition is op-
tional. This corresponds to the most general situation such
that at each trial the CS may or may not change its salience
Figure 5: A random Cantor set Cpr2 corresponding to a randomized Hull model
of the second type for n = 6 iterations and uniform probability distribution.
(i.e., different CS may be presented), the US may or may
not be presented, and the US intensity and salience may
vary with each presentation. This could be a natural sit-
uation where the animal is surrounded by several dynam-
ically evolving stimuli in the environment. Tailoring the
algorithm, one can reduce the system to a controlled ex-
perimental design (including with partial reinforcement on
a randomized schedule) more flexible that the one of the
previous case (i.e., we can present stimuli with other val-
ues of the saliences and a US with different magnitudes).
An example of this randomized Cantor set Cpr2 is given by
Fig. 5.
There are two factors that may complicate a fractal-based
analysis of conditioning processes with a random component:
the fact that β and λ are not independent and the extension to
a multi-cue setting. Both factors should be taken into account
when planning a realistic simulation, but they do not mar the
core of the theory. Concerning the first, we have considered a
case where the US is presented on a random schedule (λ = 1
or λ = 0 depending on the trial) but β is fixed. Since β and λ
are both properties of the US, β could or should vary depending
on the presence or absence of the stimulus and, in general, one
expects that β(λ = 1) > β(λ = 0) (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972),
i.e., the US is more salient when is present. Taking this into
account can modify the simple partial-reinforcement model we
presented above but not qualitatively, as we will see later.
In the presence of more than one CS (Rescorla–Wagner
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model), trial-varying CS salience (Mackintosh model) and US
magnitude (Pearce–Hall model7), the random-fractal construc-
tion becomes multidimensional and much more varied. For
each experimental design, one can draw a unique random frac-
tal onR2. Its Hausdorff dimension can be estimated as usual but
with a given probability 1 − q < 1, where q is the probability
that the set be empty (Falconer, 2003).
5.2. Relation with performance variability
Random fractals are a not-so-old acquaintance in biologi-
cal sciences and they can be found in physiology (Bassingth-
waighte, Liebovitch, & West, 1994; Eke, Herman, Kocsis, &
Kozak, 2002), neuroscience (Werner, 2010), and animal be-
havior and cognitive sciences (Kello et al., 2010). Concerning
the latter, we wish to comment on whether our formalism may
have some application to, or connectionwith, extant psycholog-
ical literature on the subject. To see this carefully and in order
to avoid hasty conclusions based on apparent but false analo-
gies, we need to make a digression in cognitive science. The
aim of comparing our random-fractal learning models with the
theory and results of the so-called 1/ f literature is not just the
acknowledgment, for the sake of the record, that fractals have
already played a role in psychology. Rather, both in random-
fractal learning models and in cognitive performance models
variability in the subject response is the main characteristics to
be studied in experiments. Understanding what has been done
and found in the cognitive field will give us some orientation
about possible testable predictions of the fractal paradigm.
The variability (or “noise”) in human performance in mem-
ory tasks, reaction tasks, mental rotation, word naming, and
so on, has become a hot trend in recent years [see Riley and
Holden (2012) for a review]. The response of the subject over
the sequence of trials can be decomposed by spectral analysis
into periodic components with frequency f (Eke et al., 2002;
Holden, 2005; Thornton & Gilden, 2005). Experimentally, it
was found that the amplitudeA of these components scale with
the frequency according to the power law |A|2 ∝ P( f ) ∼ f −δ
(Gilden, 2001; Gilden, Thornton, & Mallon, 1995; Holden,
2013; Holden, Van Orden, & Turvey, 2009; Kello, Anderson,
Holden, & Van Orden, 2008; Kello, Beltz, Holden, & Van Or-
den, 2007; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003; 2005) [an
earlier study highlighting a connection between cognition and
fractal geometry is by Kumar, Zhou, and Glaser (1993)], where
δ > 0 is a constant (denoted by α or β in the literature, all sym-
bols we do not use here to avoid confusion with saliences). The
source of this phenomenon (called 1/ f noise or 1/ f scaling be-
cause in early papers δ was found to be close to 1) is still under
debate. At first, it was interpreted as the intrinsic uncertainty,
possibly due to an estimation error, in the formation of repre-
sentations in the mind, such as the reproduction of spatial or
temporal intervals in human memory (Gilden et al., 1995). Dif-
ferent cognitive systems may have different types of idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty, all combining to give 1/ f noise accidentally;
7Due to an incomplete definition of the Pearce–Hall model, we have not
managed to analyze it with our formalism, but we do not expect to find any
conceptual difficulty in that direction.
in this interpretation, 1/ f noise is not a general, fundamental
property of human behavior (Farrell, Wagenmakers, & Ratcliff,
2006; Wagenmakers, Farrell, & Ratcliff, 2004; 2005; Wagen-
makers, van der Maas, & Farrell 2012). In an alternative nomo-
thetic perspective (Dixon, Holden, Mirman, & Stephen, 2012;
Dixon, Stephen, Boncoddo, & Anastas, 2010; Gilden, 2001;
Gilden et al., 1995; Holden, 2013; Ihlen & Vereijken, 2010; Ri-
ley & Holden, 2012; Stephen, Boncoddo, Magnuson, & Dixon,
2009; Stephen, Dixon, & Isenhower, 2009; Van Orden et al.,
2003), this stochastic behavior may be due not to specific cog-
nitive systems, nor to the mere sum of their noises, but to a
more fundamental mechanism such that cognition would hap-
pen as the emergence of patterns in a self-organizing complex
dynamical system. In particular, the 1/ f scaling might be the
collective expression of the metastable coordination of different
cognitive and motor systems in the performance of a task (Kello
et al., 2007).8
Typically, the variation of the response as a function of
the trial is, when plotted over thousands of trials, a highly
rugged (more precisely, nowhere differentiable) curve. This
curve, or graph, has the same mathematical properties of certain
stochastic processes found in statistical mechanics and anoma-
lous transport theory (Metzler & Klafter, 2004; Sokolov, 2012).
These processes are self-similar in a probabilistic sense and are
naturally associated with random fractals. The frequency distri-
bution P( f ) is the generalization of the number of contraction
maps defining deterministic fractals. In this case, one has a ran-
dom fractal and P has a spectrum of values not distributed in the
integer field. The “fractal dimension” is an ambiguous concept
here, that depends on whether one is considering the walk of
the stochastic process (vertices and edges may repeat), the trail
(vertices may repeat, edges do not), the path or graph (vertices
and edges do not repeat), the set of zeros of the path, and so on.
In cognitive psychology, one usually refers to the trial series.
To be precise, there are two stochastic processes of interest that
can closely describe the typical trial series. One is fractional
Brownian motion (FBM) (Barnes & Allan, 1966; Mandelbrot
& Van Ness, 1968) and the “fractal dimension” is the Haus-
dorff dimension of its graph G. Fractional Brownian motions
are characterized by a parameter 0 6 H < 1 called Hurst ex-
ponent, and they produce a spectrum with δ = 2H + 1. The
Hausdorff dimension of G is equal to the box-counting dimen-
sion for these stochastic processes and reads dh = db = 2 − H
almost surely, i.e., with probability 1 (Falconer, 2003). Dif-
ferent values of dh are associated with various “noises” and
frequency distributions P( f ) ∼ f 2dh−5, ranging from dh = 2
[H = 0, P( f ) ∼ f −1, ideal pink or flicker noise] to 3/2 < dh < 2
[0 < H < 1/2, P( f ) ∼ f −1 − f −2, antipersistent FBM], the
8Criticism to the nomothetic view can be found in Farrell et al. (2006) and
Wagenmakers et al. (2004; 2012); early replies are by Thornton and Gilden
(2005) and Van Orden et al. (2005), while a more recent defense is by Ihlen and
Vereijken (2013). A somewhat intermediate view between the idiosyncratic and
the nomothetic was proposed by Likens, Fine, Amazeen, and Amazeen (2015).
Other thoughts about the intrinsic uncertainty of the 1/ f -scaling phenomenon
and the role of measurement in psychological experiments, related by analogy
with quantum physics, can be found in Holden, Choi, Amazeen, and Van Orden
(2011) and Van Orden, Kello, and Holden (2010).
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special case dh = 3/2 [H = 1/2, P( f ) ∼ f
−2, Wiener process
(aka standard Brownian motion), no correlation of increments],
and 1 < dh < 3/2 [1/2 < H < 1, P( f ) ∼ f
−2 − f −3, per-
sistent FBM].9 The other process of relevance triggers for fre-
quency distributions with −1 < δ = 2Hfgn − 1 < 1, which are
described by a fractional Gaussian noise with Hurst exponent
0 < Hfgn < 1 (Eke et al., 2002). By analytic continuation of the
expression of δ, one can identify H = Hfgn − 1 and define the
fractal dimension (with no further specification) as d = 3−Hfgn
so that P( f ) ∼ f 2d−5. Apart from the d = 2 case giving ideal
pink noise (Hfgn = 1), the three main regimes are 2 < d < 5/2
[1/2 < Hfgn < 1, P( f ) ∼ f
0 − f −1, nonideal pink noise, charac-
terized by small fluctuations at short time scales and larger fluc-
tuations modulated on longer time spans], d = 5/2 [Hfgn = 1/2,
P( f ) ∼ f 0, white noise, equally sized fluctuations with no time
correlation], and 5/2 < d < 3 [0 < Hfgn < 1/2, P( f ) ∼ f
0 − f 1,
nonideal blue noise]. The value of dh or d can change accord-
ing to the experimental conditions and participants but, as said
above, it reproduces nonideal or almost ideal pink noise. Thus,
human variability in the performance of a task can be described
by a random fractal of dimension 2 . d < 2.5.
The initial idea when 1/ f cognitive noise was discovered
was that the internal biological clock (in memory tasks) and
other cognitive systems involved in reaction tasks generate a
1/ f (“ideal pink”) noise, while the motor system and the exper-
imental design produce a white-noise interference [a horizontal
line in the (log f , logN) plane] (Gilden et al., 1995). Subtle
changes in task demands introduce an exogenous variation in
the performance and modify the spectral distribution P( f ) [the
line with slope −δ in the (log f , logN) plane] representing what
is interpreted as the endogenous (or fundamental, intrinsic to
mind and body) variation. To reproduce the observed deviation
from a straight line, it was proposed to look for white noise in
data, which would flatten the 1/ f noise line at high frequen-
cies (Gilden et al., 1995). However, experiments carried with
humans failed to confirm this “layering hypothesis” (Holden et
al., 2011; Ihlen & Vereijken, 2010), pointing instead towards a
multifractal noise with different exponents δ at different scales
(Dixon et al., 2012; 2010; Holden et al., 2011; Ihlen & Verei-
jken, 2010; 2013; Stephen, Boncoddo, et al., 2009; Stephen &
Dixon, 2011; Stephen, Dixon, et al., 2009).10
Let us now go back to associative models and see whether
there is some relation between the fractal structure we found
and that of 1/ f -scaling cognitive scenarios. The most conser-
vative view is that there is no connection at all, for several rea-
sons. First, associative models describe behavior in Pavlovian
conditioning, while the 1/ f -noise effect is found in very differ-
ent cognitive tasks. Second, although the paradigm of behavior-
9See Eke et al. (2002) and Holden (2005) for this classification of P( f ) in
psychology and Falconer (2003) for the proof that dh = 2 − H almost surely
for standard and fractional Brownian motion. Still in Falconer (2003), also the
Hausdorff dimension of the trail of D-dimensional Brownian motion is calcu-
lated and is dh = 2 almost surely for D > 2.
10A psychologist-oriented review on the concepts of multifractals and mul-
tiplicative cascades, which are special multifractal distributions of points, is by
Kelty-Stephen, Palatinus, Saltzman, and Dixon (2013). See also Nonaka and
Bril (2014) for an example of “multifractal” performance.
ism states that the rules of human behavior can be inferred from
those of animal behavior, strictly speaking the established range
of applicability of associative models does not overlap with the
experiments in human response. The third reason, encompass-
ing the other two, is that trying to associate similar mathemat-
ical structures arising in different contexts may be dangerous
if there is no principle guiding us, apart that of cursory resem-
blance. In general, one can regard associative models of learn-
ing as useful tools without making any claim on their validity
as bits of a more fundamental theory of the human mind.
Having said that, under a more optimistic perspective, cog-
nitive and behavioral psychology must agree to some extent,
as they both approach the same topic (animal and human con-
duct) albeit from different directions (internalist versus envi-
ronmentalist). In a preliminary attempt to make this link, and
without the pretension of being rigorous, we notice that the ran-
dom fractal structures found in cognitive experiments can only
be compared with the randomized version of our proposal, not
with the deterministic one of the previous sections. Consider
a random Cantor set obtained by varying any of the parame-
ters λ, α, and β randomly in the interval (0, 1). To replicate as
much as we can the typical situation of the cognitive experi-
ments, we cannot change the intensity of the US, which must
remain the same at all trials. What can change is the combined
CS–US salience αβ. We will call such random Cantor set Cλ.
We can imagine that the random variation of αβ at each trial
is due to the same internal mechanisms of the 1/ f noise, let
them be the superposition of various cognitive systems or the
emergence of a complex pattern. In Fig. 6, we plot a random
Cantor set with just the desired features: λ = 1 is fixed while
αβ can take a random value (with uniform distribution) in the
interval (2/3 − 0.1, 2/3+ 0.1). The central value αβ = 2/3 cor-
responds to a deterministic ternary Cantor set and the maximal
fluctuation±0.1 (unrealistically large in order to show the effect
pictorially) represents (in a cognitive interpretation) the puta-
tive internal cognitive noise. It is useful to make a comparison
with Mackintosh model, where α changes with each trial but
deterministically. Both in that case and in our random model,
the cognitive process affecting conditioning is attention (to the
CS). However, while in Mackintosh model α has a determin-
istic gradient |αmax − αmin| throughout the duration of the ex-
periment (deterministic because determined completely by the
way attention to the CS increases or decreases as the level of
new information it carries changes), here it suffers small ran-
dom variations due to the internal flickering of the attentional
system (in the idiosyncratic view) or the global internal flick-
ering from the interaction of the attentional and other cognitive
systems (in the nomothetic view).
Comparing the geometric properties of the fractal Cλ with
those of the stochastic graphG discussed above may be a tricky
issue, since they represent different things in different types of
experiments. In the first case, the fractal Cλ is a set of points
corresponding to all possible values of what can be measured
for all possible initial conditions 0 6 V1 6 λ, i.e., a suitably
operationalized internal variable representing the CS–US asso-
ciation strength of a subject in a Pavlovian conditioning experi-
ment. In the second case, the fractal G is the actually measured
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Figure 6: A random Cantor set Cλ corresponding to a randomized Hull model
of the second type for n = 6 iterations, with λ = 1 and αβ picking values in
the interval (2/3 − 0.1, 2/3 + 0.1) with uniform probability distribution. In this
example, the CS and US saliences vary at each trial.
series of the responses of a subject in a cognitive task. How-
ever, what could be interesting to check would be, on one hand,
whether the random model Cλ fits data better than the deter-
ministic one C and, on the other hand, in an experiment uniting
the features of both Pavlovian conditioning and 1/ f cognitive
tasks, whether its application to human subjects could capture
a modulation in their response that could be statistically related
to the modulation found in cognitive psychology. We leave the
verification of this possibility to future studies. For the time
being, we cannot help but notice an intriguing parallelism: the
Hausdorff dimension of the fractals associated with condition-
ing processes decreases (from 1 to 0) with the efficiency of
conditioning, while the Hausdorff or “fractal” dimension of the
stochastic response pattern in cognitive tasks decreases (to val-
ues & 2) with the improvement of the performance (Castillo,
Kloos, Holden, & Richardson, 2015). In the first case, a bet-
ter performance means a faster conditioning and a more dust-
like set, while in the second case a better performance literally
means a smoother performance. The quantitative theoretical de-
scription proposed here yields cautious support to what found
experimentally in cognitive science and to the notion that mea-
surable behavior can be characterized, in a precise sense, by
irregular geometry.
6. Implications of the theory
Describing the geometric properties of traditional condition-
ing models in terms of fractals may be a worthwhile mathemat-
ical exercise, but its real value to the discipline should be mea-
sured in terms of its practical applications. We mention two,
one theoretical and one experimental.
The theoretical application pertains to the deterministic and
random version of the theory alike, and is a new, or different,
understanding of the psychological process underlying condi-
tioning. Consider the Hull model with one CS. The learning
rate is determined by the product αβ of the CS and US saliences
in an intuitive way: when the salience of the stimuli is low, the
subject takes longer (i.e., more trials, more sessions) to acquire
maximal association between the stimuli. We have seen that the
same statement can be recast in terms of the dimension of the
fractal associated with the model: low saliences correspond to
a set “spilling over the line” with Hausdorff dimension dh > 1,
while high saliences correspond to an ordinary dust-like, to-
tally disconnected Cantor set with dh < 1. From this refor-
mulation, we can gain a deeper insight into the nature of the
process (learning) this model attempts to describe. Since faster
learning is associated with a sparsely populated, totally discon-
nected set of points with dh < 1, it can be regarded as a process
making large “hops” between points in the support of the frac-
tal. This happens because the interval I = [0, λ] at the zeroth
iteration is depleted of points faster at each iteration. Another
consequence of this low dimensionality is that the excitatory
and inhibitory branches have no mutual intersection and each
point on the line is uniquely associated with only one similarity
branch. In a sense, excitatory conditioning is uncontaminated
by the inhibitory one. On the other hand, when αβ is small
and dh > 1, the inhibitory and excitatory branches share points
and this superposition of otherwise separated processes gives
rise, through a sort of contamination by the inhibitory branch,
to slow learning. Of course, the acquisition rate is not an intrin-
sic quality of a process but a subject-dependent feature. At this
point, the theory might naturally open up the possibility of the
existence of cognitive interference in the internal workings of
a slow-learning subject, but we prefer to leave further specula-
tions to the curious reader.
The experimental application belongs only to the random
version of the theory. The deterministic version is mathe-
matically equivalent to traditional associative models and their
predictions are the deterministic-fractal picture’s predictions.
However, the random version of the theory discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2 does make a forecast, unreachable without interpreting
associative models as fractals, about the pattern of behavioral
variations in the case of a randomly varying stimulus salience
or magnitude. Consider the case where the saliences αβ and the
magnitude λ of the US take a random value in a given distribu-
tion with support between 0 and 1. As we have seen, this can
happen in different situations, from a controlled experimental
design of partial reinforcement with randomized schedule (the
CS or the US can be either present or absent at any given trial;
then, λ takes the values 0 or 1) to the natural environment of
the subject with everchanging stimuli (where λ can take differ-
ent values at each trial). Or, according to the hypotheses put
forward in the 1/ f cognitive literature, random variations of αβ
may happen due to the internal flickering of the subject’s cog-
nitive modules. We can distinguish between two general effects
of the variation of these parameters: monotonic effects and fluc-
tuations in the subject response.
• When λ takes only two values (0 or 1, absence or pres-
ence of the US) and α is fixed, the actual learning curve is
monotonic and systematically below the absolute asymp-
tote of learning λ of the deterministic theoretical model
(Fig. 4, first type of randomized Cantor set, where β is
also fixed). This is a simple consequence of the fact that,
if αβ > 0 (positive US and CS saliences), then all subse-
quent copies of I are equal to or smaller than the one in
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the previous iteration. If β is smaller at trials where λ = 0,
then αβ is smaller, the scaling ratio 1−αβ becomes larger,
the shift (1 − αβ)λ in the mapping Sn
1
becomes larger, the
image Sn
1
◦ S2(I) is shifted more to the right, and the ef-
fect is smaller. Probably, this effect can be checked only
with averaged data, since it could be masked by fluctua-
tions caused by individual differences. A carefully con-
trolled partial reinforcement program can achieve this if
the schedule of presentation of the US is the same for all
experimental subjects.
• When λ and β are fixed (continuous reinforcement) and the
CS salience varies randomly in the interval 0 < α < 1, then
the association strength can be either above or below the
theoretical point of the deterministic model (with param-
eters λ, β and αaverage) at a given iteration, depending on
how α varies. This creates a pattern of fluctuations around
the deterministic theoretical curve (Fig. 7). Of course, the
experimenter cannot control the random variation of the
CS salience if this depends on some variable internal to the
subject. However, one can formulate an expectation of the
general trend of response variability. Since the support of
the random fractal is a subset of the interval I = [0, λ] and
all shifts are smaller than λ, points lie within this range
while points V > λ do not belong to the geometric con-
struction of the process. Therefore, fluctuations in the
subject response is predicted to be either as large as O(λ)
but asymmetric (mostly below the theoretical determinis-
tic learning curve) or symmetric around the curve but rel-
atively small. In both cases, fluctuations are progressively
and quickly damped as the curve approaches the asymp-
tote. Contrary to the previous case, these features should
be looked for in individual data, since damped small re-
sponse fluctuations would be easily flattened in averaged
data.
• When also λ varies randomly, as in a natural setting or in
the laboratory when the US magnitude is changed at every
trial, also in this case the learning curve of individuals is
characterized by a certain variability. Fluctuations above
or below the deterministic theoretical curve follow about
the same pattern just described and they are tuned by mul-
tiple products of the scaling ratios 1 − αnβn and the US
magnitude λn.
7. Conclusions
Eventually, single-variable linear or nonlinear equations can-
not account for the variety of conditioning processes we are
aware of. Systems of coupled iterative laws with multiple en-
tangled variables are typical in modern approaches such as the
SOP model of memory processing (Brandon et al., 2003; Wag-
ner, 1981), where elements of different nodes in a neural graph
interact nontrivially. Sensitivity to context further complicates
the way different stimuli interact, as reflected by later elemen-
tal theories (Brandon & Wagner, 1998; Wagner, 2003; Wagner
Figure 7: Examples of excitation learning curves (solid red) for random Cantor
sets corresponding to a randomized Hull model for n = 6 iterations (from left
to right), with λ = 1 = β and α picking values in the interval (0, 1). Top panel:
α1 = 1/3, α2 = 0.1, α3 = 0.8, α4 = 0.9, α5 = 0.2, α6 = 0.5. Bottom panel:
α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.8, α3 = 0.1, α4 = 0.99, α5 = 0.7, α6 = 0.4. Black segments
are the portions of the Cantor set where the learning curve touches upon. The
dashed red curve corresponds to the deterministic curve with α = 1/3 (ternary
Cantor set, gray segments).
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& Brandon, 2001) [see Wagner (2003) and the crystal-clear re-
views by Wagner (2008) and Wagner and Vogel (2009), also
for an account on configural theories]. Nevertheless, simple
models such as Rescorla–Wagner and Pearce–Hall have not ex-
hausted their usefulness. For instance, they are still topical in
as hot a field of research as neuroscience and they may actu-
ally coexist in models of error signal processing in the brain
(Roesch, Esber, Li, Daw, & Schoenbaum, 2012). Furthermore,
our fractal approach resonates in some yet unfathomable but in-
triguing way with the findings on task performance in cognitive
psychology, as discussed in Section 5.2. The extension to mul-
tifractals will be a most natural direction where to look into,
since it could connect with the analogous multiscale phenom-
ena met in cognitive experiments.
All this leads us to believe that the examples we presented
here are not just foundational prototypes of a more involved
paradigm. The alternative toolbox of fractal geometry, of which
we saw examples in the Hausdorff dimension as a means to rank
the efficiency of conditioning from the subject-environment in-
teraction, and in random fractals as descriptions of a variety of
programs (including of partial conditioning), or even of con-
ditioning with variable performance due to internal biological
fluctuations, may already lend itself to promising applications.
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